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HE 1985 survey period was an active one in Texas commercial law.,
Legislative changes, as well as significant court decisions, contributed
to the developments covered in this Survey. For organizational pur-
poses and ease of reference, the discussion parallels the chapter arrangement
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS-ACCELERATION AND PREPAYMENT CLAUSES
While the right of a creditor to accelerate a debt has been clearly estab-
lished in Texas for several years,3 the method of accelerating a debt has been
the subject of frequent litigation.4 During the 1985 survey period the
* B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University.
1. A survey period includes cases reported in the Southwestern Reporter Advance Sheet
from October 15th of one year to October 15th of the following year. These dates are chosen
to meet publication deadlines. A few cases that are decided late in the year, therefore, are not
reported by West Publishing Company until the survey period has closed. This explains the
1984 decision date on a few of the cases discussed in this survey.
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.08 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1986). The chapters in the Code are organized as follows: Chapter 1, General Provisions;
Chapter 2, Sales; Chapter 3, Commerical Paper; Chapter 4, Bank Deposits and Collections;
Chapter 5, Letters of Credit; Chapter 6, Bulk Sales; Chapter 7, Documents of Title; Chapter 8,
Investment Securities; and Chapter 9, Secured Transactions.
3. The Uniform Commercial Code first became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966. Uni-
form Commercial Code, ch. 721, §§ 1-101 to 10-105, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1. In 1967 it
became part of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Texas Business and Commerce
Code, ch. 785 §§ 1-6, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343-2621. Section 1.208 of the Code, authorizing
the use of acceleration clauses, has been in effect for almost 20 years. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.208 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
4. See, e.g., Ogden v. Gilbralter Sav. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233-34 (Tex. 1982) (holder
failed to give unequivocal notice of intent to accelerate); Slivka v. Swiss Ave. Bank, 653 S.W.2d
939, 940-41 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (maker expressly waived notice of intent to
accelerate and notice of acceleration); Bodiford v. Parker, 651 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1983, no writ) (holder failed to give any notice of intent to accelerate); Highpoint
of Montgomery Corp. v. Vail, 638 S.W.2d 624, 626-27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982,
no writ) (creditor's acceptance of late payments does not waive future rights to accelerate; any
notice of intent to accelerate for future default must be unequivocal); McGowan v. Pasol, 605
S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (creditor's acceptance of late
payments does not waive future right to accelerate; holder must give notice of future intent to
accelerate). Four more acceleration cases under the Code were reported during the Survey
period: Cruce v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 696 S.W.2d 656, 57 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ)
(contractual waivers of notice are enforceable); Baldazo v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc., 695 S.W.2d
815, 817 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ) (reviewing procedures for acceleration); Emf-
inger v. Pumpco, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ) (note ex-
pressly waived notice of intent to accelerate notwithstanding late payments); Velde v.
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Amarillo court of appeals outlined the basics of acceleration law in Baldazo
v. Villa Oldsmobile, Inc.5 The court stated that
if a secured promissory note grants the holder an option to accelerate
the note upon the maker's default, equitable principles require the
holder to give notice of several events. The holder must make presenta-
tion of the note and demand payment of all past due installments prior
to acceleration. The holder must further advise the maker that acceler-
ation will occur and the entire balance will be due and payable if the
maker fails to cure the delinquency.
If payment of the delinquency is not forthcoming, the holder must
give the maker notice that acceleration has occurred. Once notice is
served the debtor can no longer cure the default. The entire debt be-
comes due and payable. 6 The Baldazo court emphasized that the above
sequence of notices must be followed. According to these prescriptions
"[N]otice that the debt has been accelerated has no legal effect unless
preceded by notice that the debt will be accelerated." '7
Beyond the basics, the principal issue that is developing in the Texas law
of acceleration involves the validity of waivers of the right to notice of an
intent to accelerate and the right to notice of acceleration. A split in the
judicial approach toward this issue may be occurring, and an analysis of the
evolution of the waiver concept is instructive in analyzing this split. In
Ogden v. Gilbralter Savings Association8 the Texas Supreme Court discussed
the sequence of required notices at some length. The word waiver appears
twice in this discussion, not as the direct focus of the court's discussion but
instead as a parenthetical aside, describing a possible alternative to the giv-
ing of the required notices. 9 This brief mention, however, served as the basis
of decision in subsequent cases finding a debtor had waived the right to no-
tice of intent to accelerate, to notice of acceleration, or to both. 10 This line
Swanson, 679 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.) (holder
called demand notes on comakers death; case decided under Nebraska law).
5. 695 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
6. Id. at 817.
7. Id. (citations omitted). In Baldazo the court held that the single notice sent to the
debtor by the creditor was not adequate notice of an intent to accelerate the debt, because the
only reference to acceleration was a statement that "[i]f the sale price is less than the total
amount you owe, you still owe the rest." [Emphasis in original.] Id. The creditor may have
been lulled into believing that this notice was adequate, because the debtor had voluntarily
surrendered the collateral after missing several payments. The creditor may have also relied
on the fact that the content of the notice focused on the disposition of the collateral pursuant
to a private sale, as required by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.5049(c) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1986). The court, however, was very clear on the point that a notice of intent
to accelerate was required. The court of appeals reversed the trial court and rendered a take-
nothing judgment against the creditor. Id. See also Williamson v. Dunlap, 693 S.W.2d 373,
374 (Tex. 1985) (denying right to accelerate when no notice of intent to accelerate was given).
8. 640 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1982).
9. Id. at 233-34. In both instances the word "waiver" appears as part of a parenthetical
phrase. In highly edited form the statement by the Court was that "in the absence of a waiver,
the holder ... must ... demand payment ... prior to exercising his right to accelerate ...
Proper notice that the debt has been accelerated, in the absence of a contrary agreement or
waiver, cuts off the debtor's right to cure his default . . ." Id. 233-34.
10. See, e.g., Real Estate Exch., Inc. v. Bacchi, 676 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (right to notice of acceleration waived; no duty to give notice of
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of cases applies a literal interpretation of Ogden without inquiry into the
underlying policy of the case. In the latest case of this series reported during
the survey period, Cruce v. Eureka Life Insurance Co.," two of the three
judges found a waiver based on the literalist approach, 12 but the third judge
wrote a vigorous dissent 13 based on a policy analysis of Ogden 14 and its pre-
decessors.15 Under this analysis the notice requirements surrounding accel-
eration are of equitable origin and are not subject to contractual waiver. 16
According to the dissent the notice requirements help protect a debtor
against forefeiture by giving a meaningful opportunity to cure defaults before
acceleration is declared and a foreclosure takes place.' 7 This analysis ren-
ders the mention of waiver in Ogden dictum because the creditors had not
made any claim of waiver before the court. 18 As an alternative ground to set
aside a foreclosure, the dissent also urged that the courts should construe
strictly against the lender any waiver contained in a lending agreement. 19
Additionally, any waiver should meet the Ogden test of clear and unequivo-
cal language by bringing home to the debtor effective knowledge of the rights
he has waived. 20 The dissent would hold that the language used in the
waiver clause before the court was inadequate to meet this standard.21
Although one dissent does not clearly establish a trend, a thorough review
and careful analysis of the concepts of effective waiver make the dissenting
opinion a persuasive one and may herald a new line of lower appellate court
intent to accelerate); Cortez v. Brownsville Nat'l Bank, 664 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1984, not writ) (notice of intent to accelerate waived in note); Chapa v. Herb-
ster, 653 S.W.2d 594, 601 (Tex. App.-Tyler, 1983, no writ) (notice of acceleration dispensed
with if waived in note).
11. 696 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
12. Id. at 657.
13. Id. (Howell, J., dissenting).
14. Id. The Ogden test embodies the policy that a contractual waiver cannot stay the
hand of equity.
15. The predecessors were Allen Sales & Servicenter, Inc. v. Ryan, 525 S.W.2d 863, 864-
66 (Tex. 1975) (discussing historical basis for presentment prior to optional acceleration) and
Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253, 214 S.W.2d 614, 616 (1948) (requirement of presentment im-
posed for protection of maker).
16. 696 S.W.2d at 657 (Howell, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 659.
18. Id. at 661.
19. 696 S.W.2d at 662-63 (Howell, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 664. The waiver in the note said, "each maker, surety and endorser of this note
expressly waives all notices, demands for payments, notices of intention to accelerate the ma-
turity protest and notice of protest, as to this note and as to each, every and all installments
hereof." Id. at 656. The waiver clause in the deed of trust said:
That in the event of default in the payment of any installment, principal or
interest of the note hereby secured, in accordance with the terms thereof, or of a
breach of any covenants herein contained to be performed by grantors, then and
in any such events beneficiary may elect, grantors hereby expressly waiving pre-
sentment and demand for payment, to declare the entire principal indebtedness
hereby secured with all interest accrued thereon and all other sums hereby se-
cured immediately due and payable ....
Id. at 656-57. The author believes the dissent had a good point. The language used in these




cases less willing to find waivers of rights to notification. No reported Texas
case has discussed a middle ground in the area of acceleration and waiver.
Under the default provisions of Chapter 9 of the Code,22 certain rights of the
debtor can only be waived after a default has occurred. 23 The right of re-
demption24 is one of the rights singled out for this special treatment, and it
would not be illogical to hold that a right to notice of intent to accelerate is
sufficiently akin to the right to redemption to justify similar treatment. Even
if Ogden is read literally, nothing in that opinion discusses the proper time
for waiver. The literalist line of cases has not addressed the issue of timing,
apparently on the assumption that a pre-default contractual waiver can be
fully effective. In addition to raising the arguments made by the dissent in
Cruce, a debtor might do well to raise the possibility of post-default waiver
as an equally literal interpretation of Ogden.
A problem often related to acceleration is whether the acceleration clause
used in an instrument purports to allow the collection of unearned interest in
violation of the Consumer Credit Code.25 In Yates Ford, Inc. v. Ramirez26
the supreme court settled the question whether interest rates calculated on
the basis of a thirty-day month instead of the number of actual days in a
given month violated the Consumer Credit Code. 27 In the five cases consoli-
dated in Yates the overcharge ranged from a low of $.09 to a high of $3.10.
The court held that although each contract technically violated the Con-
sumer Credit Code, the de minimus doctrine applied to the overcharges be-
cause they resulted from a "slight error in calculating the finance charges
under a highly technical statute" 28 and not from "an unscrupulous scheme
to defraud citizens."' 29 A concurring opinion criticized the use of the de
minimus theory on the ground that the Consumer Credit Code is a penal
statute the courts should construe strictly and refrain from blurring the
bright line created by the legislature.30 According to the concurrence, a
court could achieve the result reached by the majority through application of
the Annual Percentage Rate formulas approved by the Consumer Credit
22. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.501-.507 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
23. See, e.g., id. §§ 9.504 (after default debtor may waive right to notice of sale); 9.505
(imposing duties on seller as to disposition of collateral if debtor has not waived rights after
default); 9.506 (unless waived debtor may redeem collateral after default).
24. Id. § 9.506 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
25. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01 to 5069-15.08 (Vernon 1971 & Supp.
1986). The Texas Consumer Credit Code is not a true code since it is not part of the official
Texas codifications, but it has acquired this name by popular usage. The acceleration clause
problem referred to in the text is reviewed at some length in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v.
Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324, 328-32 (Tex. 1984).
26. 692 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1985).
27. This method of calculation is sometimes called "odd-days" calculation. The "odd
days" problem arises from a difference in the manner of calculating a month under TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.010) (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1986) as compared to the manner
of calculating a month under the federal Truth in Lending Act as provided in 12 C.F.R.§ 226(b)(5)(ii) (Appendix J) (1985). Mathematically inclined readers who have a computer
and spreadsheet software can spend many happy hours playing with the differences in the
calculations.
28. 692 S.W.2d at 55.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 55 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
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Code3' and the federal Truth in Lending Act.32 Calculation pursuant to
these formulas revealed that the creditor charged less than the maximum
allowed under the Consumer Credit Code on all five contracts. 33 Use of the
concurring judge's suggested method would have avoided the uncertainties
inherent in application of the de minimus doctrine.
II. SALES TRANSACTIONS
A. Enforceability of Sales Contracts
1. Statute of Frauds: Burden of Showing Exceptions. The general rule
under section 2.201 of the Code is that a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500.00 or more is not enforceable unless a writing exists that is
sufficient to show that the parties have made a contract of sale that is signed
by the party against whom the other party seeks enforcement. 34 Despite this
general rule, a contract for the sale of goods may be enforceable if the case
fits within one of the exceptions stated in the same section. 35 In two cases
decided during the Survey period aggrieved buyers sought to enforce oral
contracts for the sale of goods.36 In one of the cases the court held that the
buyer had the burden of requesting the submission of special issues that
would bring the case within an exception to the statute of frauds. 37 The
buyer's failure to request any special issues on the matter was fatal to the
claim of an enforceable oral agreement. 38 In the other case the buyer suc-
cessfully resisted a motion for summary judgment by submitting an affidavit
alleging that the seller had accepted, indorsed, and deposited a $1500 check
issued in part payment for a truck trailer. 39 The buyer attached a copy of
the cancelled check to the affidavit and noted on the check that it was issued
for a forty foot trailer. The court held that the affidavit and attachment were
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact and denied summary
judgment. 4°
2. Parol Evidence and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Section 17.46 of
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)41 makes it a deceptive
trade practice to represent "that an agreement confers or involves rights,
remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are
31. TEX. REV. Civ. ANN. art 5069-7.03(1) Class 1 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
32. 12 C.F.R. § 226(b)(5)(ii) (Appendix J) (1985).
33. 692 S.W.2d at 56-57 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring).
34. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
35. Id. § 2.201(c). The exceptions include admissions made in legal proceedings, part
performance by delivery and partial payment. Id.
36. See Mitchell v. Jones, 694 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
writ), W.H. McCrory & Co. v. Contractors Equip. & Supp. Co., 691 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1985, writ reftd n.r.e.).
37. W.H. McCrory & Co. v. Contractors Equip. & Supply Co., 691 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. Id. at 721.
39. Mitchell v. Jones, 694 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
writ).
40. Id.
41. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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prohibited by law."' 42 Section 2.202 of the Code allows a party to use parol
evidence to supplement the terms of a written agreement when the writing is
incomplete in one or more respects. 43  The question that then arises is
whether a seller violates the DTPA if he misrepresents rights under a con-
tract in its supplemental parol aspects instead of misrepresenting one of its
written aspects. In Bob Robertson, Inc. v. Webster" the court answered this
question affirmatively and held the seller liable for a DTPA violation. 45 The
contract in Bob Robertson was silent on a delivery date, but the seller had
orally promised delivery of goods within ten weeks. Tender of delivery,
however, did not occur for more than six months. The court permitted sup-
plementation of the contract by parol evidence to show the promised deliv-
ery time of ten weeks and upheld a jury finding that this representation was
false.
46
3. Assignment of Rights. In an interesting case involving the negligent fail-
ure of the publisher of a Yellow Page Directory to include an ad for a car
rental business, the Corpus Christi court of appeals held in Reuben H. Don-
nelley Corp. v. McKinnon47 that a limitation of liability clause in the adver-
tising contract was ineffective to prevent the recovery of lost profits by the
affected business. 48 The court noted that no other Texas court had previ-
ously decided the issue in the context of a negligent failure to fulfill an adver-
tising contract. 49 One of the defenses raised by the defendant publisher was
an anti-assignment clause in the advertising order form. Since the con-
tracting owner had sold the car rental business after the advertising order
was placed, the publisher argued that it had no liability to the assignee of the
advertising contract. Although recognizing that the Code is not directly ap-
plicable to contracts for advertising services, the court dismissed the anti-
assignment clause argument on the ground that both the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts 50 and several provisions of the Code 5' permit assignments
despite clauses denying the right to assign.5 2 Under both the Restatement
and the Code, the aggrieved party is entitled to an action for damages, but
the assignment is not rendered ineffective. 53 The court held that the adver-
tiser had a duty running to the assignee that would support a claim for negli-
gent failure to provide the Yellow Page advertising. 54
42. Id. § 17.46(b)(12).
43. Id. § 2.202.
44. 679 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1984, no writ).
45. Id. at 689-90.
46. Id.
47. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. McKinnon, 688 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 616.
49. Id. at 615.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2) (1979).
51. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.210, 9.104(6) & 9.318(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968 & Supp. 1985).
52. 688 S.W.2d at 615.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2) (1979); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.210(5) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).




1. Warranties Created by Sample. Under the Code sellers may create ex-
press warranties by affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods, by
description of the goods, or by exhibition of a sample or model. 5 In Thrall
v. Renno56 the buyers contracted for the construction of an outdoor brick
patio. They selected the brick for the project based on the color of a sample
shown to them by the contractor. The contractor constructed the patio by
laying the bricks in a sand base. Within a few months the color of the bricks
changed from pink to white because of a chemical reaction to water. The
patio was also no longer level. The buyers sued for breach of an express
warranty regarding the quality of the bricks and for breach of an implied
warranty of good and workmanlike installation. The court held that no ex-
press warranty was created by exhibition of the sample because the seller
had made no representation of the quality of performance of the brick when
used as patio brick.57 Although this conclusion is open to question, the
court's decision that the contractor had breached the implied warranty to
construct the patio in a good and workmanlike manner rendered the point
moot. 58 The court also held that failure properly to construct the patio was
an unconscionable action, or course of action, and that the evidence sup-
ported the recovery of damages to replace the patio as well as the recovery of
attorney's fees. 59 The damages were trebled pursuant to the provisions of
the DTPA. 60
2. Warranties of Merchantability. Unless excluded or modified, a warranty
of merchantibility is implied in every contract for the sale of goods if the
seller is a merchant with respect to the goods covered by the contract. 61 In
1980 the Texas Supreme Court held that the protection afforded by the war-
ranty of merchantability extends not only to the buyer, but also to employees
of the buyer who are injured by a product that is unfit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which the employees normally use the product. 62 Lack of privity
of contract between the employee and the seller was not a bar to warranty
recovery. 63 The court in Bernard v. Dresser Industries, Inc.64 applied the
rule to permit the recovery of damages by an employee injured by the explo-
sion of a pipeline pressure gauge. 65 The court correctly held that the buyer
need not show that the gauge was defective for recovery on a breach of war-
ranty theory.6 6
55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
56. 695 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. Id. at 86.
58. Id. at 86-87.
59. Id. at 87-88.
60. Id at 85-86. Breach of warranty is made a basis for a DTPA claim under TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
61. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
62. Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 465 (Tex. 1980).
63. Id.
64. 691 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
65. Id. at 739.
66. Id. at 738.
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Although lack of privity does not bar employees from maintaining war-
ranty actions, lack of any contact with the product does operate as a bar in
warranty claims asserted by persons whose injuries result from not using the
product. In Church v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc.67 the plaintiffs inge-
niously argued that allegedly incorrect warnings concerning use of a drug to
counteract Rh positive blood factors during pregnancy constituted a breach
of warranty to them. The plaintiffs argued that the attending physicians did
not administer the drug to them because of the warnings. The plaintiffs rea-
soned that the abolition of the privity doctrine, 68 in conjunction with deci-
sions allowing recovery for mental anguish without direct contact, 69
demonstrated that no contact with the product was required to maintain a
warranty action. The court held that the abolition of the privity rule did not
amount to a rule that no sale was required.70 A sale to someone affected by
the product must still occur.71 The court further held that the cases allowing
recovery for mental anguish dealt with recovery of particular damages as
part of a recognized cause of action and not with the creation of action it-
self.72 The court summarized its decision by stating, "[W]e hold that no
cause of action is created for breach of warranty, where the action com-
plained of is motivated by not buying, using or coming in contact with the
product.... Appellant's only connection, if any, with the product, was that
she didn't use it.'73
3. Warranties of Fitness for a Particular Purpose. The warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose differs from the warranty of merchantability in that
it does not arise in every sale. The warranty only comes into existence when
the seller has reason to know of a particular purpose for which the buyer
plans to use the goods and knows that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill
or judgment in selecting suitable goods. 74 In International Armament Corp.
v. King75 the supreme court found a breach of this warranty in the sale of a
shotgun that one could fire despite the engagement of the safety mecha-
nism. 76 Evidence in the case supported a finding that the seller was aware of
this design defect, but had deliberately chosen not to warn buyers of this
67. 694 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
68. See Garcia v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 465 (Tex. 1980) (privity not a
requirement to maintain warranty action for personal injuries).
69. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex. 1983) (allowing mother to
recover for mental anguish resulting from death of son); Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 678
S.W.2d 205, 212 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ granted) (allowing mother to recover for
mental anguish resulting from death of child); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Reed, 659 S.W.2d
849, 852-53 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ refd n.r.e.) (allowing mother to re-
cover for mental anguish resulting from death of a child).




74. The requirements for an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose appear in
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
75. 686 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1985).
76. Id. at 599.
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problem. 77 The seller had, in fact, distributed a brochure for some time that
described the shotguns of this type as being meticulously assembled and
machined. The court upheld an actual damage award of $234,053.60 and a
punitive damage award of $1,500,000 plus attorney's fees based on the evi-
dence in the record. 78
4. Warranties in the Sale of Homes. In Evans v. J. Stiles, Inc.79 the
supreme court again addressed the question of warranties that attach to the
sale of residential dwellings. Although little doubt existed previously, every
sale of a dwelling now clearly includes warranties that the dwelling is fit for
human habitation and is constructed in a good and workmanlike manner.80
The seller can, however, disclaim these warranties. 8 ' The supreme court
held that "[T]he implied warranty of construction in a good workmanlike
manner is independent of the implied warranty of habitability; therefore the
trial court properly rendered judgment for the Evanses based upon the jury's
finding that the house was not constructed in a good workmanlike man-
ner." 82 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' holding that no
breach had occurred because the jury had failed also to find the house unin-
habitable and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.83
The implied warranties that come into existence in the sale of a dwelling
can be disclaimed under Texas law if the disclaimer is "clear and free from
doubt." 84 In McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp. 85 the court held that a
disclaimer was effective when the contract provided that "purchaser has
made a physical inspection of the unit and, thus is taking the unit, all appli-
ances and utility fixtures and equipment without warranty from seller, express
or implied .... 86 Fortunately for the buyer, the contract also provided that
the seller was not bound by any other representations "unless the same are
expressly set forth in this agreement or in a subsequent written agreement
executed by seller."' 87 The court held that a subsequent letter from the seller
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 689 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1985).
80. Id. at 400. Earlier cases discussing these warranties include Gutpa v. Ritter Homes,
Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1983) (builder liable to subsequent purchaser for defects not
reasonably discoverable at time of sale); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968)
(law implies warranties of habitability and construction in good workmanlike manner).
81. 689 S.W.2d at 400; see also G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex.
1982) (implied warranties can be waived).
82. 689 S.W.2d at 400.
83. Id. In another case involving warranties in the sale of a dwelling, the court of appeals
had no difficulty applying the correct warranty standards. See De Los Santos v. Alamo Lum-
ber Co., 683 S.W.2d 48, 51-52 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
84. G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. 1982).
85. 685 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. Id. at 757 (emphasis added by court). The author has argued elsewhere that the
courts should develop stricter standards for the disclaimer of warranties in the sale of a dwell-
ing. See Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 207,
215-16 (1984). At a minimum the law should require that sellers make the disclaimers
conspicuous.
87. 685 S.W.2d at 757 (emphasis omitted).
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created an express warranty to repair the roof.8 8 The court's finding entitled
the buyer to try the issue whether the seller had breached the express
warranty. 89
5. Disclaimer of Warranties. Although the standards differ sellers clearly
may disclaim warranties in the sale of goods and warranties in the sale of
homes under current Texas law.90 A growing number of cases have also
held that a disclaimer of warranties can bar a DTPA claim based on breach
of warranty.91 A refinement of this position may be found in Reliance Uni-
versal Inc. v. Sparks Industrial Services, Inc. ,92 in which the court held that
a warranty disclaimer was not effective to bar a DTPA recovery when the
buyer had received favorable jury findings on an independent DTPA
claim.93 In Reliance the jury found that the seller had represented that cer-
tain goods were of a particular standard, quality, or grade when they were of
another; and that the seller had represented the goods to have characteristic
ingredients, uses, or benefits that they did not have or involve.94 The court
held that even though a disclaimer might be effective if the action had been
brought only as a warranty claim, the disclaimer had no effect on an in-
dependent DTPA claim even though the quality of the goods also figured in
that claim. 95
C. Performance Disputes
1. Manner of Rejection. Upon tender of delivery a buyer is entitled to re-
ject goods in whole or in part if they fail in any respect to conform to the
contract. 96 A buyer must reject the goods within a reasonable time after
delivery.97 If the buyer receives and retains goods without making an effec-
tive rejection, the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods98 and must
pay at the contract rate for the goods accepted.99 In Ho v. Wolfe' °° the
court applied these rules and found that the buyer of a restaurant business
had failed to reject effectively a tender of goods when the buyer had received
88. Id. at 760.
89. Id.
90. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (establishing
standards for disclaimers in sale of goods); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 393
(Tex. 1982) (establishing standards for disclaimers in sale of dwellings).
91. See, e.g., G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. 1982) (disclaimer of
implied warranties in sale of dwelling barred DTPA claim); McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium
Corp., 685 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dis-
claimer of implied warranties in sale of condominiums not violative of DTPA); Ellmer v. Dela-
ware Mini-Computer Sys., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ)
(disclaimer or warranties on computer bar to DTPA claim).
92. 688 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
93. Id. at 892-93.
94. Id. at 892. The language of this finding tracks the wording of TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
95. 688 S.W.2d at 892-93.
96. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.601 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
97. Id. § 2.602(a).
98. Id. § 2.606(a).
99. Id. § 2.607(a).
100. 688 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
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and retained the goods. 01 The court required the buyer to pay the contract
price for the goods, less an offset for some goods that were not delivered. 10 2
Under the scheme of chapter 2 of the Code, even if a buyer fails to make
an effective rejection and becomes liable to pay at the contract rate for goods
that are accepted, the buyer may be entitled to recover damages from the
seller for a breach of the warranty covering the accepted goods. 10 3 The right
to recover damages for a warranty breach is contingent on the buyer's giving
prompt notice of the breach. 104 Failure to give notice within a reasonable
time after discovery operates to bar the buyer from any remedy under the
Code. '05
In Carroll Instrument Co. v. B. W.B. Controls, Inc. 106 the seller sued the
buyer for payment of the contract price. The buyer defended on the alterna-
tive grounds that it had never accepted the goods or, if accepted, the goods
were defective and it had given proper notice of the breach. The court held
that the buyer properly gave notice by showing one of the defective parts to a
representative of the seller and that this notice was sufficient to reject the
goods when the buyer exercised no further dominion or control over
them. 10 7 The court was thus not required to reach the question of recovery
for breach of warranty.
In Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park'08 the buyer's notification was less
effective. The buyer gave notice of a defect to the immediate seller of the
goods, but failed to notify the remote manufacturer. The court held that the
buyer's failure to give notice to the manufacturer barred any recovery
against the manufacturer. 10 9 The court expressly disagreed with an earlier
decision 10 by the El Paso court of appeals, which held that notice to the
immediate seller was the only notice required to preserve the buyer's breach
of warranty action even against a remote manufacturer."'I
D. Remedies and Statute of Limitations
Under section 2.725 of the Code a buyer must bring an action for breach
of warranty within four years after the breach occurs. 112 Unless the war-
101. Id. at 696. The buyer of the restaurant and related restaurant inventory took posses-
sion of the restaurant, but later tried to reject the inventory delivered because part of the
inventory was missing. The court held that acceptance of the restaurant precluded the buyer
from rejecting the inventory. Id.
102. Id. at 696.
103. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.714 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
104. Id. § 2.607(c).
105. Id.
106. 677 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
107. Id. at 657-59.
108. 696 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
109. Id. at 425.
110. See Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 888-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, no writ).
111. 696 S.W.2d at 425. The court noted that at least one another Texas case had also
required notice to a remote manufacturer, Melody Homes Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502 S.W.2d
196, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.) (manufacturer of mobile
home notified of defect within a reasonable time after discovery).
112. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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ranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods, a breach occurs
when tender of delivery is made.' 1 3 The decision in Garcia v. Texas Instru-
ments, Inc. introduced some confusion into Texas law. 114 The Texas
Supreme Court failed to note clearly whether it was measuring the four-year
time period from the date of tender or from the date of discovery of the
defect." 5 The lower appellate courts are correcting this confusion by clearly
identifying the date of tender of delivery as the triggering date for measuring
the four-year statute of limitations. In five cases decided during the survey
period the courts were careful to specify the tender of delivery as the critical
event that begins the running of the statute. 116
An important sidelight to this statute of limitations issue was raised in
Cooper v. Republic Bank Garland. 117 In this case the buyers had contracted
for the installation of a backyard swimming pool. The contractor soon
thereafter assigned the contract to a bank. When the buyers discovered de-
fects in the pool they sued the contractor and recovered a judgment that was
never satisfied. The buyers ultimately notified the bank that they would no
longer make payments under the assigned contract and the bank threatened
foreclosure under the contract. The buyers then sued the bank, seeking a
permanent injunction against foreclosure and demanding return of all mon-
ies previously paid to the bank under the contract. The court held that any
claim by the buyers was barred by the four-year statute of limitations of
either section 2.725 of the Code 1 8 or article 5527 of the Civil Statutes 119 as
it existed when the cause of action arose. 120 The buyers were, however, enti-
tled to offset the amount of their damages against the remaining balance due
under the contract as a defensive matter, even though the statute of limita-
tions had run on their affirmative claim. 12 1 This defensive use of accrued
113. Id. § 2.725(b).
114. 610 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. 1980).
115. A more extensive discussion of this problem may be found in Krahmer, supra note 86,
at 221-22.
116. Cooper v. RepublicBank, 696 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ)(statute of limitations for breach of warranty occurs when tender is made); Weeks v. J.I. Case
Co., 694 S.W.2d 634, 635-36 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ) (statute of limitations
began to run when farm equipment delivered); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Centainteed Corp., 687
S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute of limitations began to run
when roofing material delivered); Fitzgerald v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 683 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute of limitations began to run when forklift
was delivered to employer).
117. 696 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
118. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
119. Id. art. 5527 (Vernon 1979). An issue existed as to whether the pool qualified as a
good as defined in Id. § 2.105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The court did not have to decide
this issue because both § 2.725 and art. 5527 contained a four-year time period and, under
either statute, more than four years had passed before the plaintiffs brought action.
120. 696 S.W.2d at 633-34.
121. Id. at 634. In support of this result, the court quoted the following passage from the
earlier case of Shaw v. First State Bank, 13 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1928, no
writ): "[ljimitation is applicable to the remedy and not the right. The right, as distinguished
from the remedy is often available in equity as a defense, when the remedy for its enforcement
would be barred, if asserted affirmatively in a legal action." Id. at 137 (citations omitted).
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damages by way of offset even after a statute of limitations has run can be a
useful tool for an attorney.
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Form of Negotiable Instruments
The most fundamental dichotomy in chapter 3 of the Code 122 is whether
an instrument is negotiable or non-negotiable. If an instrument is negotia-
ble, a purchaser may qualify as a holder in due course and gain all of the
rights attendant upon such status, including the right to enforce the instru-
ment despite the existence of personal defenses. 123 If an instrument is non-
negotiable the purchaser is only an assignee and remains subject to any de-
fenses or claims that a maker or indorser may assert against the instru-
ment.12 4 In Amarillo National Bank v. Dilday125 the court was faced with
an unusual situation. A certificate of deposit met all of the requirements to
qualify as a negotiable instrument,1 26 but the certificate was denominated on
its face as being non-negotiable. The court concluded that nothing in chap-
ter 3 prohibited the parties to an instrument from agreeing to make the in-
strument non-negotiable even though it might otherwise meet the formal
requirements for negotiability. 127 The issuing bank had urged the court to
hold the certificate non-negotiable because it had paid the proceeds of the
instrument to one of two joint payees without requiring presentation of the
certificate. By destroying negotiability the bank sought to raise the defense
of payment against the claim of the other joint payee, who still held the
certificate. This defense would have been untenable if the instrument had
been negotiable.128 Although the bank won the battle on negotiability, it
still lost the war on the defense of payment, because the certificate specified
that the bank was to make payment "on return of this certificate properly
endorsed."' 29 By failing to require return of the certificate, the bank
breached its contractual obligation to the joint depositor who had possession
of the instrument and who could have done nothing more to protect her
interest in the certificate. The court, therefore, held the bank liable for the
full amount of the certificate of deposit.' 30
B. Liability of Parties
1. Signatures by Representatives. Section 3.401 of the Code provides that
"[N]o person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears
122. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.101-.805 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
123. See Id. § 3.305 (listing rights of a holder in due course).
124. See Id. § 3.306 (listing limited rights of a non-holder in due course).
125. 693 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
126. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (listing formal
requisites for negotiability).
127. 693 S.W.2d at 41.
128. Payment must be made to the holder of a negotiable instrument to effect a discharge.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.603 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
129. 693 S.W.2d at 40 (emphasis omitted).
130. Id. at 43.
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thereon."131 This fundamental rule of commercial paper is at the heart of a
considerable amount of litigation concerning the liability of parties, whether
as principals or agents. In Anderson v. Badger132 the court had little diffi-
culty in finding that an individual was not liable on an instrument that he
had neither signed nor ratified as an obligation of his partnership. 133 The
court in Eggers v. Hinckley reached a different result.134 The court found
that the members of a joint venture had authorized one of the venturers to
sign a promissory note on their behalf.135 Based on this authorization, the
members of the venture were held liable on the note. 136
In three other recent cases the defendants sought to avoid liability on the
theory that they had signed the instruments only as representatives and did
not intend to become personally obligated. 137 Under the doctrine of Seale v.
Nichols, 138 the classic Texas case on this issue, a person who signs a promis-
sory note is presumed to be liable in an individual capacity unless he or she
can carry the burden of proof to the contrary. 139 If the plaintiff has moved
for a summary judgment, this burden includes presentation of sufficient evi-
dence to raise a fact issue on the elements of the affirmative defense of signa-
ture made in a representative capacity. 14 In two of the recent cases the
person asserting this affirmative defense was unable to survive a motion for
summary judgment because of failure to introduce enough evidence to raise
an issue of fact that would overcome the presumption of individual liabil-
ity. 141 In the third case the allegation of representative capacity was unsup-
ported at trial and the presumption of individual liability resulted in a
judgment rendered against the alleged agent. 142 The lesson one should learn
from these cases is very simple: agents who sign commercial papers for their
principals should always disclose on the paper itself that they are signing
only in a representative capacity.
2. Liability for Contribution Between Co-Makers. Under pre-Code law
when one co-maker paid the entire amount of a note he or she was entitled
to receive contribution from the other co-makers based on an implied prom-
131. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.401(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
132. 693 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
133. Id. at 647.
134. 683 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
135. Id. at 475.
136. Id. at 478.
137. Bryd v. Southwest Multi-Copy, Inc., 693 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, no writ); Retamco, Inc. v. Dixilyn-Field Drilling Co., 693 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); A. Duda & Sons, Inc. v. Madera, 687 S.W.2d 83
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
138. 505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974).
139. Id. at 254.
140. Id.
141. Bryd v. Southwest Multi-Copy, Inc., 693S.W. 704, 706 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1985, no writ); Retamco, Inc. v. Dixilyn-Field Drilling Co., 693 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).




ise of reimbursement. 143 In Siegler v. Ginther'44 the court determined that
the Code has not changed the common law rules on contribution and that
one co-maker who pays an instrument is still entitled to seek contribution
from the other co-makers. 145 The action for contribution is not an action on
the instrument, so any defenses that the law makes available to the other co-
makers can be raised in the action without regard to issues of holder in due
course status. 14 6 In Siegler the co-maker against whom contribution was
sought was able to raise successfully a defense based on a special agreement
made at the signing of the note.147 Based on this defense the claim for con-
tribution was denied.' 4 8
3. Liability of Holders to Makers. The Federal Trade Commission holder
in due course rule 49 has introduced a new form of liability on instruments
that runs from holders to makers. In Kish v. Van Note 150 the Texas Supreme
Court permitted the makers of a note to recover the amount paid to the
holder along with attorney's fees, as well as additional damages against a
defaulting contractor.' 5 1 The makers had contracted for the installation of a
fiberglass swimming pool. They arranged financing with a bank under a
note and contract that contained the required FTC notice.152 The contrac-
tor's attempted installation was a total failure and the pool was never func-
tional. The disappointed makers sued the contractor, the bank, and the
insurance company that had insured the bank against default on the loan.
The jury found every submitted issue in favor of the makers. The supreme
court ruled that, as against the contractor, the makers were entitled to re-
cover under both the Deceptive Trade Practices Act' 5 3 and the Consumer
Credit Code, 154 including the recovery of statutory penalties under both stat-
utes. 155 As against the insurer, which had become the holder by assignment
from the bank, the makers were entitled to cancellation of the lien created by
the note and contract because of the total failure of consideration for the
note. 156 The terms of the note also specified that the holder was subject to
143. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Stevenson, 567 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978,
no writ); Charles v. Charles, 478 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Bietel v. Bietel, 109 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, writ dism'd).
144. 680 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
145. Id. at 890.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 891.
149. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.1-.2 (1985). The rule has been in effect since 1976 and requires
that any consumer credit contract or note contain the following notice in at least ten-point
bold type: "Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses
which the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto
or with the proceeds hereof." 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1985).
150. 692 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1985).
151. Id. at 469.
152. See supra note 149 for the required notice.
153. 'tEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
154. Id. art. 5069-1.101 to 5069-15.08.
155. 692 S.W.2d at 467.
156. Id. at 468.
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any claims that could be asserted against the contractor. 5 7 As against the
bank, the makers were entitled to recovery of all amounts paid to the bank
under the note and contract. 15 8 The court also held the insurer and the bank
jointly and severally liable for the attorney's fees incurred by the makers in
prosecuting an appeal of the case. 159 This case is a clear demonstration that
financing lenders should take the FTC rule to heart when a flagrant default
occurs on the underlying contract.
C. Discharge of Parties
1. Tender of Payment as Partial Discharge. Most negotiable notes contain
provisions for the payment of interest, costs of collection, and attorney's
fees. A party can avoid liability for the subsequent accrual of these expenses
by making a tender of full payment when or after a note comes due. 160 In
Churchill v. Russey 161 a junior lienholder tendered full payment of a ven-
dor's lien note to the holder. The holder refused the payment. In a subse-
quent action the holder asserted the right to recover the amount of the note
along with attorney's fees and costs of collection. The court allowed recov-
ery for the amount of the note plus interest to the time of tender, but cor-
rectly applied the Code rule on tender of payment and denied recovery of
subsequent interest, attorney's fees, and costs. 162
2. Discharge by Impairment of Collateral. Section 3.606 of the Code dis-
charges a party from liability on an instrument whenever the holder unjusti-
fiably impairs collateral given as security for the instrument. 163 A split of
authority exists as to whether the co-maker of a note can claim the benefit of
this rule. 164 In a significant decision handed down during the survey period,




160. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.604(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
161. 692 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
162. Id. at 598.
163. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
164. Cases holding that co-makers can be discharged include: Rushton v. U.M.&M Credit
Corp., 245 Ark. 703, 434 S.W.2d 81, 83-84 (1968) (unjustifiable impairment of collateral may
release co-maker; co-maker held liable, however, because collateral not unjustifiably impaired);
Southwest Fla. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Schirow, 388 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(recognizing split of authority; adopting view that co-maker discharged if unjustifiable impair-
ment of collateral); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Hasner, 82 Misc. 2d 550, 369 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978
(1975) (wife sold collateral below fair market value to related party; husband discharged for
fair value of collateral if lender knew of husband's right of recourse against wife). Cases hold-
ing co-makers are not discharged include: Wohluter v. St. Charles Lumber & Fuel Co., 62 Ill.
2d 16, 338 N.E.2d 179, 182 (1975) (discharge for impairment of collateral does not apply to
co-makers); Smiley v. Wheeler, 602 P.2d 209, 212 (Okla. 1979) (defense not available to mak-
ers who transfer rights in collateral to third party); Oregon Bank v. Baardson, 256 Or. 454, 473
P.2d 1015, 1017-18 (1970) (bank's impairment of collateral did not discharge co-maker); Com-
merce Union Bank v. May 503 S.W.2d 112, 116-17 (Tenn. 1973) (holder's failure to maintain
fire insurance did not discharge co-maker).
165. 691 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1985).
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surety to the extent of the co-maker's right of contribution. 166 The co-maker
should, therefore, be entitled to assert a discharge if the co-maker's right of
recourse has been unjustifiably impaired. 167 This decision places Texas in
line with those jurisdictions that extend the benefit of discharges under sec-
tion 3.606 to the co-makers of secured promissory notes. 168 The defense of
discharge because of the unjustifiable impairment of collateral is an affirma-
tive defense which the party asserting the defense must raise, 169 since the




1. Joint Accounts. In Chopin v. Interfirst Bank Dallas171 and Magee v.
Westmoreland 72 the courts considered the issue whether the funds in a joint
bank account passed to the surviving joint depositor upon the death of the
other depositor or whether the funds became property of the decedent's es-
tate. In both cases the courts concluded that even though parties could ef-
fect a nontestamentary transfer of rights in a joint account, the mere
establishment of a joint account was not sufficient to infer a survivorship
agreement that courts would view as effective under section 439 of the Pro-
bate Code. 173 Both courts noted that the terms of the account agreement
between the bank and its customer are crucial to a determination of owner-
ship rights.174 Three elements are required to create an effective survivor-
ship agreement: (1) there must be a written agreement (2) signed by the
decedent (3) that makes the interest of the decedent survive to the other
party. 175 Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show the intent of the dece-
dent to create a survivorship interest; the party claiming the interest must
show intent by using the written agreement itself.176 The courts found in
both cases that the deposit agreements were not sufficient to create a survi-
vorship interest and the funds in the accounts were thus property of the
decedents' estates. 177
Other problems with joint accounts can occur while the joint depositors
are still alive, as demonstrated by William v. Cullen Center Bank & Trust.'7
8
In Williams the bank sued both joint depositors to recover the amount of an
166. Id. at 585.
167. Id.
168. See supra note 164 and cases cited therein.
169. 691 S.W.2d at 585.
170. Gonzales v. Pan Am. Nat'l Bank, 692 S.W.2d 111, 111-12 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
no writ).
171. 694 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. 693 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. 694 S.W.2d at 83; 693 S.W.2d at 615-16. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a)
(Vernon 1980).
174. 694 S.W.2d at 83; 693 S.W.2d at 616.
175. 694 S.W.2d at 83; 693 S.W.2d at 616.
176. 694 S.W.2d at 84; 693 S.W.2d at 616.
177. 694 S.W.2d at 85; 693 S.W.2d at 617.
178. 685 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1985).
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overdraft on their joint checking account. One of the depositors never ap-
peared and a default judgment was rendered against him. The other deposi-
tor was able to show that she had never signed a check on the account and
had never made a withdrawal from the account. The court noted that com-
munity property theories were not applicable to the case because the bank
had not presented any evidence that the depositors were husband and
wife. 179  The issue posed for decision was, therefore, whether the bank's
right to charge the account under section 4.401 of the Code 8 0 included the
right to recover the amount of an overdraft from a joint depositor who had
not participated or benefited from the overdraft and who had not ratified the
transaction creating the overdraft. After a careful review and analysis of
both primary and secondary authorities,' 8' the court held that the better
view was that the bank could not recover the overdraft from the joint deposi-
tor in the absence of proof of participation, benefit, or ratification. 8 2 The
court also suggested that a bank could include express language creating
joint liability for overdrafts in a deposit agreement when the account is first
established as an alternative means of recovering for overdrafts, 83 but the
bank had not done so in this case.
2. Duty of Bank to Raise Customer's Defenses in Garnishment Proceedings.
In Southwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Calmark Asset Management, Inc. 184 a
bank was served with a writ of garnishment against its customer's bank ac-
counts. At the time the writ was served the customer had an account de-
nominated as "Calmark Asset Management, Inc. in trust for LaSpanda
Apts."' 8 5 The bank notified its customer of the garnishment and advised the
customer to obtain counsel. In its answer to the garnishment proceedings,
however, the bank stated that it was indebted to "Cal-Mark Asset Manage-
ment, Inc." The answer did not indicate that the account carried a trust
179. Id. at 312.
180. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.401 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
181. Among the authorities reviewed by the court were the cases of: Popp v. Exchange
Bank, 189 Cal. 296, 208 P. 113, 114 (1922) (making co-signers jointly liable would make every
co-signature a partnership); Bremen Bank & Trust Co. v. Bogdan, 498 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973) (wife who was signatory on husband's business account held jointly liable; case
decided on basis of Missouri statutes and not U.C.C.); Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 115
N.H. 94, 333 A.2d 442, 444 (1975) (acknowledging commentators split as to nondrawing co-
signer's liability); United States Trust Co. v. McSweeney, 91 A.D.2d 7, 457 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279
(1982) (co-tentants are not automatically agents for each other); National Bank v. Derhammer
(No. 1), 16 Pa. D. & C.2d 286, 288 (1958) (parties clearly identified as husband and wife).
Secondary authorities include: B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND
CREDIT CARDS 2.8[4] (1981) (arguing banks should expressly make all co-signers liable for
the overdrafts of the others); 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 385-86 (1964) (arguing co-signers should be jointly liable); Note,
Liability for Overdrafts of a Joint Bank Account under the UCC, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 499,
507-08 (make co-signers jointly liable will encourage banks to pay overdrafts and, therefore,
expand commercial practices).
182. 685 S.W.2d at 315.
183. Id. at 314.




designation. A court rendered judgment awarding the garnishor the entire
amount in the account and the bank paid the judgment on the next day.
In a subsequent action by the customer against the bank the court held
that the bank had a duty to disclose the trust designation of the account in
the garnishment proceeding. 186 Failure to fulfill this duty rendered the bank
liable to the customer to the extent that the funds were actually trust
funds. 187 The court entered judgment in favor of the customer for the full
amount of the trust account.188
B. Bank Payments
1. Items not Properly Payable. A bank is always entitled to charge items
against an account if the items are "properly payable" from that account.' 8 9
If a bank mistakenly pays an item that is not properly payable, the bank may
still be able to charge the account by exercising the rights of subrogation
provided in section 4.407 of the Code.190 In American Communications
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commerce North Bank919 a deposit agreement
required two signatures on all checks for more than $500 drawn against a
customer's checking account. The bank erroneously paid a check for some
$1800 that bore only one signature. In an action by the customer to recredit
the account the bank was able to subrogate itself successfully to the rights of
the payee against the customer and avoid liability for the error.' 92
2. Late Return of Items. Under section 4.302 of the Code a bank is ac-
countable for the amount of an item presented to it that is not paid or re-
turned by midnight of the banking day following the day of presentment.' 9 3
In Financial Universal Corp. v. Mercantile National Bank,194 a case of first
impression in Texas, 195 the Dallas court of appeals held that this rule is
applicable to items that are re-presented to a bank a second time following
an initial timely dishonor.196 The payor bank failed to give a timely notice
of dishonor after the second presentment. The bank argued that section
186. Id. at 200.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 201.
189. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.401(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
190. Id. § 4.407. The section provides, inter alia, that:
If a payor bank has paid an item ... under circumstances giving a basis for
objection by the drawer or marker .... the payor bank shall be subrogated to the
rights
(1) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or maker; and
(2) of the payee or any other holder of the items against the drawer or maker
either on the item or under the transaction out of which the item arose; and
(3) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of the item
with respect to the transaction out of which the item arose.
Id.
191. 691 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
192. Id. at 47-48.
193. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
194. 683 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
195. Id. at 817.
196. Id. at 817-18.
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4.302 only applied to the original presentment of an item. The court rejected
this argument. 197 The bank also argued that the presenting bank had re-
presented the check as a collection item instead of a demand item because of
a notice that accompanied the check when it was presented the second time.
Although the court did not believe the notice accompanying the check was
itself sufficient to demonstrate that the check was a collection item, the sum-
mary judgment evidence did not conclusively negate the possibility that an
agreement or custom existed between the presenting bank and the payor
bank that would excuse the payor from compliance with the rule of section
4.302.198 The court remanded the case for trial on that issue.1 99
3. Process of Posting Abolished as a Means of Final Payment. As a result of
1985 legislative action 2°° the process of posting is no longer an indicator of
whether an item has been finally paid. 20 1 Under the revised version of sec-
tion 4.213 an item is now treated as finally paid when the payor bank has
done any one of the following:
(1) paid the item in cash; or (2) settled for the item without reserving a
right to revoke the settlement and without having such right under stat-
ute, clearing house rule or agreement; or (3) made a provisional settle-
ment for the item and failed to revoke the settlement in the time and
manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule or agreement. 20 2
The legislature also added a provision permitting banks to accept, pay, or
charge an item to an account before or after regular banking hours. 20 3
Under the revision a bank is not obligated to determine the time of day an
item is received. The bank may also withhold the amount of an item, with-
out liability, pending a determination of the priority of the item vis-a-vis
competing claims, stop-orders, or legal process served on the bank.20 4 One
practical effect of these changes is to delay the moment of final payment to
the midnight deadline, except for items that are paid in cash, a result that
closely parallels that of West Side Bank v. Marine National Exchange
Bank.20 5 A second effect is to insulate the bank from liability when a ques-
tion of the priority of payment of an item arises. 20 6
197. Id. at 816-18.
198. Id. at 818-19. An agreement or custom between banks can extend the time allowed
for payment or dishonor beyond the midnight deadline. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.103 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
199. 683 S.W.2d at 819.
200. Act of June 14, 1985, ch. 621, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 4721.
201. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.213(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
202. Id.
203. See Id. § 4.303(b).
204. Id.
205. 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587, 593-95 (1968) (allowing reversals of entries for any
reason if within time allowed for return of items to clearinghouse).
206. For some of the difficulties encountered by a bank under the process of posting rule,
see Consolidated Cigar Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 749 F.2d 1169, 1171-73 (5th Cir. 1985)




V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. Definitions and Procedure
1. Standby Credit or Documentary Credit? In Apex Oil Co. v. Archem
Co. 207 a contract for the sale of propane called for the buyer to provide a
standby letter of credit as security for payment of the purchase price. The
first line of the letter of credit that the buyer provided stated, "this is a docu-
mentary credit and not a stand by credit. ' 208 The seller refused to perform
under the contract on the ground that the buyer had breached its obligation
to provide a standby credit. The buyer sued and the court granted a sum-
mary judgment in its favor. The seller appealed. This case provided the
court with an opportunity to write a brief dictionary of meanings for a series
of letter of credit terms that have come into common legal use in the last few
years, but are not terms of art defined in the Code itself.209 The court's
definitions are helpful and are included here as a reference for attorneys in-
volved in letter of credit transactions.
The court defined a standby letter of credit as one " 'whereby the issuer
agrees to pay the beneficiary upon presentment of documentation indicating
that the account party has defaulted on a payment obligation ... [and] is
used primarily to finance or secure an underlying intangible or money in-
debtedness undertaken by the account party.' ",210 A "documentary" letter
of credit is one that requires "a 'draft on the letter of credit [to] be accompa-
nied by some document, such as a document of title or a certificate of de-
fault.' ",211 The court contrasted the documentary letter with a clean letter
of credit, "which 'is payable merely upon the presentation of a draft [with]
no accompanying documents.' ",212 The Apex Oil court held that the terms
documentary credit and standby credit are not mutually exclusive and that
the buyer had fulfilled its obligation under the contract of sale.213
2. Letter of Credit Disputes as Basis for Interpleader. Interpleader is a pro-
cedural device designed to protect an innocent stakeholder from multiple
litigation and the risk of multiple liability.214 In Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v.
Commonwealth Development Corp. 215 a bank that had issued a standby letter
of credit to a beneficiary on behalf of two of its customers sought to inter-
plead the beneficiary and the customers to avoid what it viewed as possible
multiple liability. The court's analysis of section 5.114 of the Code216 led to
207. 770 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1985).
208. Id. at 1354.
209. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.1101-.117 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1986) govern letter of credit transactions.
210. 770 F.2d at 1355 (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d
109, 113 (Tex. 1979)).
211. 770 F.2d at 1355 (quoting East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
593 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 1979)).
212. Id.
213. 770 F.2d at 1356.
214. 1 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 3.38 (1981).
215. 686 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
216. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1986).
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the conclusion that interpleader was not a procedure available to the
bank. 217 Since the bank was entitled either to honor or dishonor the demand
for payment under the letter of credit, the bank would not be liable to its
customers for whichever decision it made. 2 18 The risk that payment under
the credit might leave the bank without a right to reimbursement against the
customers was not regarded as "the kind of exposure to multiple liability
that would justify interpleader relief."' 2 19 Even though the court deemed
interpleader improper, since all parties were before the court, it exercised
discretion and treated the case as one of permissive joinder of a request for
declaratory relief for purposes of the appeal.220 By virtue of the pleadings
that the parties had filed in the case, the court held that the beneficiary was
entitled to the fund as the only party asserting an interest in the fund. 22 1
The court also held that judicial admissions contained in the bank's plead-
ings established that neither customer was liable to reimburse the bank for
moneys paid out under the letter of credit.222 This case seems to demonstrate
that, for a bank, interpleading a letter of credit can be a little bit like leaving
the vault unlocked.
B. Payment Under a Letter of Credit
In Westwind Exploration, Inc. v. Homestead Savings Association223 the
Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that a beneficiary is required
strictly to comply with the terms of a letter of credit before the issuer must
honor a draft drawn under the credit. 224 The court further held that
whether the presenting bank has met the standard of strict compliance is a
question of law for the court unless an ambiguity exists or if another theory
raises an issue concerning the intent of the parties. 225 The letter of credit in
question provided that upon presentment, the beneficiary should submit cop-
ies of invoices evidencing deliveries of crude oil made during the month of
August, 1982. Although the credit was originally to expire in September of
1982, the parties extended the expiration date to December of that year and
expressly provided that "[a]ll other terms and conditions shall remain the
same."' 226 The beneficiary (Westwind) made a demand for payment under
the credit for deliveries of oil that had taken place in July, August, Septem-
ber and October. Westwind submitted invoices for deliveries made during
these months along with the demand for payment. The supreme court deter-
mined that dishonor of the demand was proper because Westwind had not
strictly complied with the terms of the credit when it attempted to collect
217. 686 S.W.2d at 230-31.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 231.
220. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 43 and TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965 &
Supp. 1984), upon which the court relied as the basis for its action.
221. 686 S.W.2d at 232.
222. Id. at 235.
223. 696 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985).
224. Id. at 381.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 380.
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under the credit for oil deliveries made in months other than August. 2 2 7
Westwind had raised no theory showing an intent on the part of the issuing
bank to extend the bank's liability under the credit to cover oil deliveries
made in any month other than August.
228
VI. BULK TRANSFERS
What Constitutes a "Major Part" of the Assets of an Enterprise? Reported
Texas decisions have never interpreted many of the provisions of chapter 6
of the Code.229 One of the more fundamental issues that has remained open
is the question of what constitutes a transfer of a major part of the assets of a
business subject to chapter 6.230 In Bergen, Johnson & Olson v. Verco Manu-
facturing Co. 231 the El Paso court of appeals addressed this issue and con-
cluded that a sale of less than fifteen percent of the inventory of a business
did not constitute the sale of a major part of the inventory so as to bring the
transaction within the purview of chapter 6.232
Rights of Judgment Creditors in a Bulk Transfer. In Rome Industries, Inc. v.
Intsel Southwest,2 3 3 another case of first impression under chapter 6, a judg-
ment creditor contended that it had rights superior to those of other credi-
tors of the transferor by virtue of having obtained a judgment against the
transferor before the bulk transfer occurred. The court held that merely
obtaining a judgment was not sufficient to perfect a judgment lien against the
property of the transferor, and the judgment creditor was only entitled to
share in the consideration paid by the transferee on a pro rata basis along
with other creditors who had not reduced their claims to judgment. 234 The
court also held that service of a writ of garnishment by the judgment credi-
tor on the transferee after the judgment creditor had received notice of the
pending bulk transfer would not operate to cut off the rights of other credi-
tors because the proceeds of sale were payable to the creditors of the trans-
feror and not to the transferor itself.235
What Constitutes Concealment of a Bulk Transfer? In a third novel case
under chapter 6236 the San Antonio court of appeals considered the question
of when the parties to a bulk transfer had so concealed the transfer that an
227. Id. at 382.
228. Id. at 382.
229. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.101-.111 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) governs the
area of bulk transfers. Most of its provisions have never been litigated in Texas.
230. As stated in Id. § 6.102(a) a bulk transfer is "any transfer in bulk and not in the
ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of the material, supplied, merchan-
dise or other inventory (Section 9.109) of an enterprise subject to this chapter." Id.
231. 690 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
232. Id. at 118-19.
233. 683 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
234. Id. at 780-81.
235. Id. at 780. In reaching this conclusion the court relied upon TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE
ANN. § 6.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).




aggrieved creditor could bring an action challenging the transfer outside the
usual six-month limitations period stated in section 6.111.237 Although no
written notice of the transfer was ever given to creditors, the record dis-
closed that the aggrieved creditor knew or should have known of the transfer
through the conduct of its agents. The aggrieved creditor also had presented
no evidence of any affirmative attempt to conceal the transfer. The court
held that the concealment "contemplated by section 6.111 occurs when the
record discloses affirmative efforts at concealing the transfer and when there
had been complete and total failure to comply with the notice provisions of
the statute. ' 238
Transfers in Settlement of a Security Interest. Under section 6.103 of the
Code transfers made "in settlement or realization of a lien or other security
interests" are exempted from the provisions of chapter 6.239 In Hixon v.
Pride of Texas Distributing Co. 240 a debtor paid over all of the proceeds of a
bulk transfer to two secured creditors who held perfected security interests
in the property of the transferor. The transferee failed to give written notice
of the transfer in a timely fashion to the unsecured creditors. 241 One of the
unsecured creditors sued for failure to give timely notice. The transferee
defended on the ground that this transfer was an exempt transaction under
section 6.103 because he paid the proceeds to holders of valid security inter-
ests. The court found no Texas cases on point and only a few cases from
other jurisdictions. 242 After a review of these authorities the court held that
the proper interpretation of section 6.103 was that the exemption for trans-
fers in settlement of a security interest was only applicable if the debtor had
defaulted on the secured claims and the secured creditors had a right to
foreclose at the time the bulk transfer occurred. 243 Since the secured credi-
tors had presented no evidence of default under either security interest, the
court disallowed the claim of exemption and held the transferee liable for
failure to give timely notice of the transfer.2 "
VII. SHIPMENT CONTRACTS
Carrier's Duties in C.O.D. Shipments. In a pair of interesting cases, Duder-
237. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN § 6.111 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (six-month
limitation applies unless "the transfer has been concealed").
238. 685 S.W.2d at 430.
239. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.103(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
240. 683 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
241. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) requires notice of
a proposed transfer to be given at least ten days before the transferor takes possession of the
property.
242. The cases from other jurisdictions were: Techsonic Indus. v. Barney's Bassin' Shop,
621 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (bulk transfer valid because of evidence of default);
Starman v. John Wolfe, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377, 382-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (bulk transfer not
exempt under § 6.103); American Metal Finishers, Inc. v. Palleschi, 55 A.D.2d 499, 391
N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1977) (bulk transfers for settlement of indebtedness valid).




stadt Surveyors Supply, Inc. v. Alama Express, Inc. 245 and Swest, Inc. v.
American Airlines, Inc. ,246 the San Antonio court of appeals and the Dallas
court of appeals have split on the scope of a carrier's duty in receiving pay-
ment under a C.O.D. shipment contract. In Duderstadt a motor carrier de-
livered goods in exchange for a cashier's check that the tenderor had forged.
The San Antonio court of appeals reviewed the terms of the shipment con-
tract, as well as the applicable National Motor Freight Classification
rules.247 The court held that the carrier had exercised reasonable care in
accepting the cashier's check as C.O.D. payment since the cashier's check
was regular on its face and no circumstances made the transaction appear
suspicious.
2 4 8
In Swest an airline delivered goods under a C.O.D. shipment contract in
exchange for a check that appeared certified, but was actually forged. In
contrast to the decision in Duderstadt the Dallas court of appeals made no
reference to any applicable tariff rules or regulations and decided the case
solely on the basis of a common law analysis of the carrier's duty of care.
Relying largely on a 1928 decision 249 by then Chief Judge Cardozo, the
court reasoned that a carrier has a duty to verify the validity of a certified
check.2 50 Since the airline had taken no steps to verify the certification, it
was liable to the shipper for the value of the misdelivered goods.25 ' The
supreme court has granted a writ in Swest and it will be interesting to see
how the court deals with this issue.
252
VIII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Validity of Security Agreements
If the author of this article had been asked to select one case as the most
significant decision handed down during the survey period the answer would
unhesitatingly have been Gonzalez v. Gainan's Chevrolet City, Inc. 2 5 3 In
Gonzalez the Texas Supreme Court held "there is no reason to presume the
legality of terms and provisions of a contract which are required or prohib-
ited by the Consumer Credit Code and which are not relevant to a finding of
usury."' 254 With this single statement the supreme court eliminated the doc-
trine of "presumed legality" that the courts of appeal had developed in nu-
merous cases of alleged Consumer Credit Code violations. 255 The court
245. 686 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
246. 694 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ granted).
247. Nat'l Motor Freight Classifications 100-H.
248. 686 S.W.2d at 355.
249. Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 247 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E. 708, 709-10
(1928).
250. 694 S.W.2d at 402.
251. Id. at 401-02.
252. The last Texas case to deal with a similar problem appears to have been Herrin
Transp. Co. v. Robert E. Olson Co., 325 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959,
no writ).
253. 690 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1985).
254. Id. at 887.
255. Cases applying the doctrine of presumed legality that were specifically overturned by
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based the rationale for this decision on the declaration of legislative intent in
section 1 of the Consumer Credit Code. 256 In a bow toward precedent the
court recognized its earlier decisions in the area of usury that held "a con-
tract which is alleged to be usurious on the ground that it calls for the collec-
tion of unearned interest is to be construed as complying with the law, if it is
reasonably susceptible of such an interpretation. ' 257 The court left no
doubt, however, that it was limiting the doctrine of presumptive legality to
the area of usury and that this doctrine would no longer have any validity in
cases involving other alleged violations of the Consumer Credit Code.258 A
dissenting opinion in Gonzalez pointed out that a distinction between usury
violations and other Credit Code violations "is illusory at best"259 and "re-
sults in an insupportable contradiction. ' 260 The dissent argued that the
courts should apply the doctrine of presumptive legality to any interpreta-
tion of the Consumer Credit Code, regardless of the particular violation
alleged. 26'
The practical effects of Gonzalez are immense. Practitioners should re-
view every security agreement used in consumer credit transactions for lit-
eral compliance with the Consumer Credit Code to eliminate any ambiguity
that might result in a violation. The possibility always exists, however, that
a court might hold one or more clauses that appear innocuous violative of an
obscure provision of the Credit Code.262 One hint of a way to obtain some
general protection against this possibility is found in Jim Walter Homes, Inc.
v. Schuenemann,263 a usury case cited by the supreme court in its acknowl-
edgment of usury precedents. 264  In Jim Walter Homes the court
commented:
we fail to understand why acceleration clauses are drafted which do not
include a sentence expressly disavowing any intention to collect exces-
sive unearned interest or finance charges in the event the obligation is
accelerated.... To settle the matter clearly in the contract between the
parties is a service to the creditor, the debtor, and the taxpayers of this
state." 2
65
the supreme court included Haley v. Pagan Lewis Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 319, 320 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christ 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.) and Grant v. Friendly Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
612 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.). The part of
Hinojosa V. Castellow Chevrolet Oldsmobile, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) that relied on the doctrine of presumed legality was disapproved.
256. Act of May 23, 1967, Ch. 274, § 1 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 608; 15 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. pp. 1-2 (Vernon 1971).
257. 690 S.W.2d at 887 (quoting Jim Walter Homes, Inc v. Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324,
332 (Tex. 1984)).
258. 690 S.W.2d at 887.
259. Id. at 890 (McGee, J., dissenting).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. The Consumer Credit Code, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 5069-1.01 to-
15.08 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1986), has been amended at numerous times and has by accretion
become cumbersome and uncoordinated. A serious effort to rewrite the entire Credit Code to
make it comprehensible is sorely needed.
263. 668 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1984).
264. Gonzalez, 690 S.W.2d at 887.
265. 668 S.W.2d at 333 n.6.
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Borrowing from this suggested drafting technique a creditor might find some
protection in a clause that says, in effect: "The parties intended that this
contract is to be construed as being in compliance with the Texas Consumer
Credit Code and that any ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the legal-
ity of this contract." As extra protection the clause might further provide
that "The creditor expressly disavows any intention to violate any of the
terms of the Texas Consumer Credit Code and this contract wil be enforced
only in a manner that is in accordance with the applicable laws of the State
of Texas." The parties should also consider the use of bold print and a sepa-
rate signing in an attempt to make this kind of blanket clause effective.
Needless to say, after Gonzalez the creditor should follow the chapter and
verse of Texas law in any enforcement of a contract.
B. Priorities
1. Priorities Between a Lien Creditor and a Secured Party. One of the most
important aspects of a security interest is the protection afforded to a secured
creditor against the competing claims of third parties. 266 Such third parties
can include lien creditors,267 trustees in bankruptcy,268 buyers of goods,269
or other secured creditors.270 In Owen v. Vibrosearch Exploration, Inc.271
the court applied section 9.301 of the Code272 to find that a creditor who
acquired a perfected security interest in the accounts receivable of a debtor
had priority over the competing claim of a judgment creditor who sought to
garnish one of the accounts. 273
2. Priorities in Returned Goods. In a well-reasoned decision274 the
Amarillo court of appeals confronted the issue of the priority of competing
secured claims in returned goods. The facts giving rise to the priority dis-
pute can be quickly summarized as follows. Manufacturer sold tractors to
Implement Dealer on a secured credit basis under a properly perfected in-
ventory financing agreement. Dealer sold two tractors to Buyer under a
purchase money security agreement. The purchase money security agree-
ment constituted chattel paper under the definitional scheme of chapter 9.275
Dealer sold the chattel paper to Finance Company, which purchased the
paper in good faith and in the ordinary course of its business. Buyers later
returned the tractors to Dealer. Manufacturer and Finance Company both
asserted claims to the tractors.
On these facts the court reasoned that Finance Company had priority in
266. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
267. Id. § 9.301(c).
268. Id.
269. Id. § 9.307 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
270. Id. § 9.312.
271. 694 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ.)
272. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
273. 694 S.W.2d at 425.
274. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. C.I.T. Corp., 679 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1984, no writ).
275. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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the chattel paper 2 76 under the terms of section 9.308 of the Code. 277 The
court then applied section 9.306278 because the buyer had returned the goods
to the seller. The court ruled that the Finance Company's priority in the
chattel paper continued in the returned goods as against the inventory secur-
ity interest of the Manufacturer that reattached to the goods upon their
return.
279
3. Priorities in Negotiable Instruments. In Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v.
Frigiking, Inc. 280 two secured creditors each held perfected security interests
in inventory. The debtor issued checks to one of the secured parties from
proceeds generated by the sale of inventory. The other secured creditor sued
to recover the funds represented by these checks. The court held that the
secured party receiving these checks met all of the requirements needed to
take the checks as a holder in due course. 28 1 The court also held that under
section 9.039 of the Code 282 the holder in due course of a negotiable instru-
ment has priority over a claim based on a perfected security interest. 28 3
4. Priorities in Consigned Goods. One who delivers goods to another for
sale on a consignment basis runs a substantial risk that a creditor of the
seller will succeed in asserting a priority claim to the consigned goods. 284
The consignor can obtain protection against this risk by complying with the
provisions of sections 9.114 and 9.408 of the Code.28 5 Section 9.114 pro-
vides for giving notice of the consignment to creditors of the seller. 286 Sec-
tion 9.408 permits the filing of a special consignment financing statement
identifying the interest of the consignor in the consigned goods that are in
the seller's possession. 287 Failure to comply with these provisions can result
in an expensive mistake, as the consignor discovered in Marrs v. South Texas
National Bank.28 8 In Marrs a secured creditor with a perfected security in-
terest in the inventory of a seller was held to have a priority claim to four-
teen cars consigned to the seller because of the failure of the consignor to
take the protective steps of notification and filing. 289
276. 679 S.W.2d at 142.
277. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.308 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (rights of
purchasers of chattel paper and non-negotiable instruments).
278. Id. § 9.306(e)(1) & (e)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (establishing priorities
between seller and secured party is returned or repossessed goods).
279. 679 S.W.2d at 142-143.
280. 692 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
281. Id. at 166. See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968) (requirements for holder in due course status).
282. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.309 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (protection
of purchasers of instruments and documents).
283. 692 S.W.2d at 167.
284. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.326(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (goods of
consigner subject to claims of creditors of consignee).
285. Id. §§ 9.114 & .408 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
286. Id. § 9.114.
287. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.408 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
288. 686 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
289. Id. at 678-80.
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5. Priorities in Farm Products. Persons who buy goods in the ordinary
course of business generally take free of security interests that their sellers
created. 290 An important exception to this rule denies such protection to a
person who buys farm products from a person engaged in farming opera-
tions.291 This exception sometimes allows a secured creditor with a per-
fected security interest in farm products to maintain successfully an action
for conversion against persons who buy the farm products without obtaining
a release of the security interests. 292 The 1985 Legislature limited the right
of a secured party to assert such conversion claims by adding subsection (d)
to section 9.307.293 Under the amendment a secured party may not enforce
a security interest in farm products unless the secured party notifies the
buyer within ninety days after the purchase that a security interest exists in
the farm products. 294 The notice must state the terms of the security interest
and the amount the secured party claims is owed. 295 Although in the au-
thor's opinion eliminating or limiting the farm products exception is desira-
ble on a policy level, the amendment in its current form may create more
problems than it solves because of a lack of clarity in the wording that will
invite litigation by affected secured parties. 296 In the author's view the legis-
290. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 394 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)
(cattle are farm products under § 9.307(a), and therefore, buyer does not take free of security
interest created by seller); Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186
N.W.2d 99, 103 (1971) (purchaser of cattle held liable for conversion because he did not obtain
release); Cox v. Bancoklahoma Agri-service Corp., 641 S.W.2d 400, 402-03 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1982, no writ) (purchaser of cattle did not obtain release of security agreement; held
liable for conversion).
293. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The
subsection provides:
(d) A secured party, including a secured party under a security interest cov-
ered by Section 9.312(b) of this code, may not enforce a security interest in farm
products against a person who has purchased the farm products from a person
engaged in farming operations unless the secured party gives notices of the se-
curity interest to the buyer by certified mail, return receipt requested, no later
than the 90th day after the date of purchase. The notice must state the terms of




296. For example, the 90-day time period for giving notification begins to run from the date
of purchase. When is the date of a purchase? Is it the date when a contract is signed to buy a
crop, whether or not the crop has yet been planted? Is it the date when the purchaser acquires
an insurable interest in the goods? Is it the date of passage of title or, perhaps, the date of
physical delivery to the purchaser? All of these are possible dates of purchase under Chapter
2. See id. §§ 2.105 (allowing for present sale of future goods), 2.401 (specifying when title
passes), 2.501 (specifying when buyer obtains insurable interest), 2.509 (specifying when risk of
loan passes to buyers) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
The amendment uses the term "purchase" as if it were interchangeable with the term "buy."
They do not have the same meanings under the Code. Any person who acquires an interest in
property as part of a voluntary transaction is a purchaser under the Code. Thus, a junior
secured party could claim to have purchased farm products and be entitled to notice of the
senior security interest even though that interest would otherwise have priority under other
provisions of the Code. Under this reading a senior interest would be cut off if notice were not
given. See id. §§ 1.201(9) (defining "buyer in ordinary course of business"), 1.201(32) (defin-
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lature should reconsider the amendment in the 1987 legislative session and,
if it still deems a limitation on the farm products exception desirable, it
should redraft the amendment in a better form.
Another development in the area of agricultural lending occurred at the
federal level after the end of the Survey period by Congressional passage of
the "The Food Security Act of 1985.11297 Under this act, a buyer of farm
products will take free of a security interest created by the seller unless the
secured party gives notification of the security interest to the buyer within
one year prior to the sale.298 The requirement of pre-sale notification in-
troduces an interesting complexity into agricultural lending because a poten-
tial buyer must be identified before a sale takes place. The act attempts to
deal wit this problem by permitting secured parties to require the debtor to
provide a list of potential buyers so notice of the security interest can be
given before a sale occurs. 299 Criminal sanctions can be invoked if the
debtor fails to provide the name of the buyer prior to sale.30° The effective
date of the notification provisions is December 23, 1986 so crops produced
during the 1986 growing season will generally be unaffected, .but secured
creditors should begin now to revise security agreements and to develop a
system for the giving of notices to avoid the inadvertent loss of a security
interest by failure to comply with the federal enactment.
C. Proceedings After Default
1. Was There a Default? Obviously no proceedings after default can occur
before a debtor has defaulted. In Rayos v. Chrysler Credit Corp. 30 1 the court
determined that no default occurred when the debtor voluntarily requested
the cancellation of an extended service plan on a car and sent the refund
check to the secured party. 30 2 The debtor intended that the secured party
should apply the refund check to the next two installments due under the
security agreement. These installments would have constituted payments
three and four, respectively, under the forty-eight month installment con-
tract. Instead of so applying the proceeds of the refund check, the secured
party credited the amount toward payment of the last two monthly pay-
ments under the 48 month installment contract (i.e., payments forty-seven
ing "purchase"), 1.201(33) (defining "purchaser"), 2.103(a) (defining "buyer") (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
297. H.R. 2100 (passed December 17, 1985, signed December 23, 1985). See Congres-
sional Record for December 17, 1985 at H 12304-12305. An alternative to the giving of
notice is provided in the act by permitting a State to establish a central filing system for farm
products and obtain certification of the system by the United States Department of Agricul-
ture. The Office of the Texas Secretary of State has no current plans to develop and implement
such a central filing system, in part because of the estimated cost of three million dollars at a
time when Texas faces severe budgetary constraints.
298. H.R. 2100, § 1324(d) & (e).
299. H.R. 2100, § 1324(h).
300. H.R. 2100, § 1324(h)(3).
The amendment is very specific in how notice must be given. Does this mean that actual
notice given in some way other than that specified is not adequate notice?
301. 683 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
302. Id. at 548.
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and forty-eight instead of payments three and four, which the debtor had
intended to pay). Since the creditor's books reflected payments three and
four as unpaid, the creditor declared a default and repossessed the car. The
creditor defended on the ground that the security agreement permitted it to
apply insurance premium refunds in inverse order of maturity. The court
had little difficulty in deciding that a service maintenance contract was more
like a warranty plan than an insurance policy and held that no default had
taken place.303 The court remanded for trial the buyer's conversion action
for wrongful repossession. 304
2. Disposition of Collateral. After a secured party has come into possession
of collateral following default, the two methods of disposition available to
the secured party are to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt or to
resell the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner and sue for any
deficiency that may result.305 According to the court in Burton v. National
Bank of Commerce306 the secured party's representations to the debtor
about which of these two methods it will use to dispose of collateral can bind
the secured party and prevent a later decision to change the method of dis-
position. 30 7 In Burton the jury findings supported a conclusion that the se-
cured party had waived its right to sell the collateral by an oral
representation that the voluntary return of collateral would extinguish the
debt as an accord and satisfaction. The court held that the creditor had
elected its remedy by its representations and could not change its mind after
the debtor voluntarily delivered the collateral to the creditor. 308
In Piney Point Investment Corp. v. Photo Design, Inc.309 the court held
that a creditor had not elected to retain collateral in satisfaction of a debt
even though the creditor still had most of the collateral in his possession
some two years after repossession. 310 The creditor had sold two items of
collateral and had given notice that he would sell the collateral at private
sale after a specified date. The sale of these items, however, did not occur
until at least six months after the notice. In reaching a decision that the
creditor had not elected to retain the collateral the court distinguished Ta-
nenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc.311 Tanenbaum sought to prevent
double recovery by a creditor who might retain the collateral and still seek a
deficiency judgment without having given notice of sale or notice of inten-
tion to retain the collateral. 312 In Piney Point the creditor had given notice of
intent to sell the collateral; the creditor in Tanenbaum had given no such
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.504 (resale of collateral and suit for defi-
ciency), 9.505 (retention of collateral in satisfaction of debt) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
306. 679 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
307. Id. at 117.
308. Id. at 119.
309. 691 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
310. Id. at 770.
311. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
312. Id. at 771-72.
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notice. Because of this distinction the Piney Point court held that Tanen-
baum was thus not a controlling precedent. 313 This decision by the court is
highly questionable and essentially restricts Tanenbaum to its facts. This
result seems inconsistent with the broader reading that the supreme court
has ascribed to that case in the later case of First City Bank v. Guex.314 In
the opinion of the author, Piney Point Investment should be regarded as an
aberration and should not be considered a valid interpretation of
Tanenbaum.
313. Id. at 770.
314. 677 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. 1984).
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